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MENTAL HEALTH-United States ex rel. Mathew
v. Nelson-Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill Based on a Finding of Dangerousness is
Constitutional, Even Though Dangerousness Is Not
Inferred from a Recent, Overt Dangerous Act.
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our
own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive
others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the
proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and
spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to
live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live
as seems good to the rest.'
In United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson,2 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held the provision
of the Illinois Mental Health Code3 permitting involuntary commit-
ment of a person in need of mental treatment constitutional.' Sec-
tion 1-11 bases commitment of a mentally ill person on the grounds
of dangerousness to himself or others, or the inability to care for
himself. The statute was challenged as violative of due process in
the absence of a recent overt act, attempt, omission or threat from
which the basis for commitment could be inferred. In upholding the
Illinois civil commitment procedure, the Mathew court rejected de-
cisions by two other district courts which required that reasonable
expectation of dangerousness or inability to care for oneself be
proved by a recent overt act, threat or omission on the part of the
patient. This article examines Mathew in light of recent trends in
1. JOHN STUART MIL, ON LIBERTY 18 (Regnery ed. 1955).
2. No. 72 C 2104 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 18, 1975). Circuit Judges Pell and Tone joined in the
majority, District Judge McMillen dissented.
3. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 911/2 (1973).
4. Id. § 1-11 provides:
"Person in Need of Mental Treatment," when used in this Act, means any person
afflicted with a mental disorder, not including a person who is mentally retarded,
as defined in this Act, if that person, as a result of such mental disorder, is reasona-
bly expected at the time the determination is being made or within a reasonable
time thereafter to intentionally or unintentionally physically injure himself or other
persons, or is unable to care for himself so as to guard himself from physical injury
or to provide for his own physical needs. This term does not include a person whose
mental processes have merely been weakened or impaired by reason of advanced
years.
5. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis.
1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975) (vacated on abstention question only).
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civil commitment and focuses on judicial reliance on psychiatry in
commitment proceedings.
THE FACTUAL CONTEXT
The plaintiffs in Mathew had been committed to mental institu-
tions under section 7 of the Illinois Mental Health Code. None of
the plaintiffs engaged in any overt acts of a dangerous nature. The
activities of the plaintiffs were not of such seriousness that danger-
ousness could be inferred.7
The plaintiffs initiated a habeas corpus proceeding under the
Civil Rights Act8 in the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. In addition, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief,9
which would have required defendants' to produce evidence of a
recent overt act, threat or omission before a mentally ill person can
be committed on the grounds of dangerousness or inability to care
for oneself." The parties stipulated that the only issue before the
court was:
the issue of the constitutionality of the [Illinois] mental health
code and as applied, in that it permits the involuntary commit-
ment of a person without any finding by the court that there has
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91/2, § 7-1 (1973). See generally 6 Loy. CH. L.J. 208, 210 (1975),
for a discussion of emergency commitment in Illinois. Involuntary commitment can be made
upon the certificate of a physician, emergency admission and admission upon a hearing and
court order. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 912, §§ 6-1 through 8-8 (1973).
7. No. 72 C 2104, slip opinion, at 5.
Strand was arrested because he tried to personally deliver a message from God to Senator
McGovern. On the basis of her neighbor's complaint, Marshall was arrested for moving
furniture around her room. She had also moved furniture up and down the street and admit-
ted to hearing voices. The other plaintiffs were Weiland, Schmidt, Fant, Serritella, Baker and
McDonald, who were also committed to mental institutions under section 7-1.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
9. Although the complaint was denominated "Third Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Suit for Injunctive Relief," only the claim for equitable relief was before the court.
10. The defendants included the Superintendent of the Chicago-Reed Mental Health
Center, the Director of the Illinois Department of Mental Health, the Public Defender of Cook
County, two judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County and the Presiding Judge of the
County Division of the Circuit Court.
11. Record, Transcript of Proceedings at 25. The plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Grippando,
clarified the injunctive relief sought in response to a question by Judge Tone: "Whether
plaintiffs' sought to have the Statute declared invalid and enjoin its enforcement. So there
won't be any Statute under which people could be committed." Id. Copy available at Loyola
University of Chicago Law Journal Office.
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been a recent overt act, attempt, omission, or threat by the person
from which the person's dangerousness to themselves [sic] or oth-
ers or the inability to care for themselves [sic] may reasonably be
inferred."2
Recognizing the state's interest in preventing the mentally ill from
harming themselves or others, the Mathew court held that Illinois
had not formulated an irrational basis for the statute. 3 The court
emphasized:
There must always be a first dangerous act in any series of danger-
ous acts . . . and the due process clause does not render the state
powerless to protect against that first dangerous act, provided it
establishes a test for determining dangerousness that is based on
a rational appraisal of the scientific knowledge that is available."
The parties offered into evidence depositions of five medical ex-
perts.'" All five experts agreed that predicting future behavior with
a high degree of certainty was impossible. Each of the plaintiffs' four
experts testified that an overt act should be a prerequisite to invol-
untary commitment or that a prediction of dangerousness which is
not based on an overt act would be of questionable accuracy."e The
defendants' expert testified that an overt act should not be a pre-
requisite for a determination that a person is in need of mental
treatment. However, he admitted it was more likely that an individ-
ual would be found dangerous if he had committed specific acts of
a dangerous nature.'7
The conflicting testimony reveals a basic disagreement on the
ability of psychiatrists to predict dangerousness. The frequency of
disagreement is amplified when the prediction is not based on a
prior overt act.'" It is doubtful, therefore, that section 1-11 is based
12. This issue is presented in Count V of the complaint. 72 C 2104, slip opinion, at 4. A
three-judge court was convened because the plaintiff sought to enjoin the operation of a state
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1281 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1284 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
13. No. 72 C 2104, slip opinion, at 18.
14. Id. at 19-20.
15. The plaintiffs' offered the depositions of four expert witnesses: Dr. Bernard Rubin, a
Board Certified Psychiatrist and Associate Professor at the University of Chicago; Dr. George
Magner, Assistant Director of the School of Social Work, the University of Illinois; Dr. Jon
Fawcett, a Board Certified Psychiatrist, and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at
the Rush-Presbyterian-St. Lukes Medical Center; Steven Goldberg, Assistant Professor at
the University of Illinois, Department of Psychology. The defendants offered the deposition
of one expert witness, Dr. Kelleher. The depositions of four employees of the Department of
Mental Health were also offered by the plaintiffs.
16. No. 72 C 2104, slip opinion, at 16. The court did not distinguish which of plaintiffs'
experts testified as to which point.
17. Id. at 17.
18. Id. at 18; Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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on a rational appraisal of scientific knowledge.
The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether com-
mitment based on a prediction of dangerousness or inability to care
for oneself without the requirement of a recent overt act comports
with due process. However, the expansion of due process rights injuvenile" and deportation hearings2 indicates that civil proceedings
which result in a deprivation of fundamental rights are not immune
from constitutional limitations. Lessard v. Schmidt,"' and Lynch v.
Baxley,22 have expanded the constitutional rights of the mentally ill
by requiring proof of a recent overt act, threat, or omission. This
requirement incorporates an objective manifestation of dangerous-
ness or inability to care for oneself, rather than relying merely upon
the subjective judgments of psychiatrists, to justify commitment.
CIVIL COMMITMENT
The Basis
Civil commitment is based on the state's inherent role as parens
patriae or on its authority under the police power to protect society
against the threat of dangerous acts.23 These two justifications en-
compass different state interests. The underlying premise of a
state's parens patriae role is that the individual derives benefit from
the commitment, regardless of the diminution of liberty entailed. 4
Commitments exercised under the police power are intended to pro-
tect the welfare of society. Inherent in the sovereignty of a state is
the authority to regulate the public health, safety and welfare.2"
19. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
21. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). This was a three-judge court decision.
22. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974). This was a three-judge court decision.
23. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Lessard V. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974); Borman,
The Selling of Preventive Detention 1970, 65 Nw.U.L. REV. 879, 915 (1971); Note,
Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally 11, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill]. In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122
(Mass. 1845), is generally considered to be the source of the parens patriae doctrine justifying
commitment of the mentally ill for treatment. In Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 57 (1890), the Supreme Court described the parens patriae power as "a most beneficient
function, and often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity." Id.
24. Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134, 1139 (1967).
25. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
The exercise of a state's police power must be in furtherance of the public's interest in such
a manner as is "reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals." Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962). See
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 23, at 1222-45, for a discussion of commit-
ment under the police power.
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Generally, a mentally ill person cannot be involuntarily confined
unless the state demonstrates that the individual is: (1) dangerous
to others; (2) dangerous to himself; or (3) in need of treatment.26 The
Illinois Mental Health Code, section 1-11, embodies these three
bases for involuntary civil commitment.27 These three criteria for
commitment have different justifications. Dangerousness to oneself
and the inability to care for oneself reflect the parens patriae notion.
Commitments based on dangerousness to others are predicated on
the police power of a state.28
Determination of Dangerousness or Inability to Care for Oneself
The courts have experienced difficulty in constructing a test for
determining dangerousness or inability to care for oneself. The
Lessard court recognized that civil confinement can be justified on
the basis of a prediction of dangerousness. However, the court
required that the prediction be based on a finding of a recent overt
act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another.'"
The Lynch court also demanded a manifestation of dangerousness
based on a recent overt act, attempt or threat before an individual
could be committed.3 1
Both Lynch and Lessard relied on Cross v. Harris,32 which in-
volved a habeas corpus attack on confinement under the District of
Columbia Sexual Psychopath Act.33 The court recognized that in
26. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972); Schneider, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 58 A.B.A.J. 1059 (1972); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories
and Procedures, 79 HoAv. L. REV. 1288 (1966). In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975),
the Supreme Court declined
to decide "whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may be
confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary statutes,
are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of such a person-to
prevent injury to the public, to insure his own survival or safety, or to alleviate or
cure his illness." Id. at 573.
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 1-11 (1973).
28. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Note, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288 (1966).
29. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
30. Id. at 1093. The court required that the state satisfy the proper burden of proof. See
text accompanying notes 70 through 86 infra.
31. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974). The court specified the minimum
findings necessary to support involuntary confinement: 1) the person to be committed is
mentally ill; 2) the person poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to himself or
others; 3) the danger posed by the person has been evidenced by a recent overt act; and 4)
there is treatment available for the illness diagnosed.
32. 418 F.2d 1095, 1099-1100 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The court stated:
Commitment cannot be based simply on the determination that a person is likely
to engage in particular acts. The court must also determine the harm, if any, that
is likely to flow from these acts.
33. 22 D.C. CODE §§ 3503-11 (1967).
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certain instances a determination of dangerousness based on a pro-
pensity to commit crimes is permissible:
If so, such detention would have to be based on a record that
clearly documented a high probability of serious harm, and cir-
cumscribed by procedural protections as comprehensive as those
afforded criminal suspects.34
The petitioner in Cross had been arrested for various acts of inde-
cent exposure. The Mathew court emphasized that the issue of
whether an overt act was necessary under either the Sexual Psycho-
path Act or the Mental Health Code of the District of Columbia was
not before the court in Cross.3 5 Therefore, Mathew found the reason-
ing of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals unconvincing.36
Instead, the Mathew court relied on Humphrey v. Cady37 to sup-
port its holding that future dangerousness need not be proved on the
basis of a recent overt act. In Humphrey, the petitioner argued that
his commitment under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act 38 was essen-
tially equivalent to commitment under the state's Mental Health
Act. 39 The Court, in discussing the policy underlying the Wisconsin
Mental Health Act and similar legislation in other states, reasoned:
Wisconsin conditions such confinement not solely on the medical
judgment that the defendant is mentally ill and treatable, but also
on the social and legal judgment that his potential for doing harm,
to himself or to others, is great enough to justify such a massive
curtailment of liberty.40
The Mathew court considered the Court's statement to indicate
approval of mental health codes in general. In addition, the court
interpreted it as an acknowledgement of the validity of a state's
social and legal judgment that an individual has potential for doing
harm.
Lessard involved the same Wisconsin Mental Health Act con-
strued by the Court in Humphrey. The Lessard court interpreted
the Supreme Court's emphasis on the potential to do substantial
harm as requiring proof of a recent overt act, attempt or threat 4
34. Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dictum).
35. No. 72 C 2104, slip opinion, at 24.
36. The court relied on Chief Justice Burger's (then Judge Burger) dissent. 418 F.2d at
1109. Judge Burger urged judicial restraint and cautioned against substituting the court's
opinions for those of the fact-finding body.
37. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
38. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 959.15 (1966), as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN., ch. 975 (1971).
39. Wis. STAT. ANN., ch. 51 (1966). This provision requires a jury determination of the
appropriateness of commitment.
40. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (dictum).
41. 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972). The court interpreted Humphrey to indi-
cate:
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Lynch interpreted the Humphrey dicta as justifying commitment
only where the conduct poses a serious threat of substantial harm
to self or to others.42
The split between the three-judge courts on whether dangerous-
ness or inability to care for oneself can be determined without proof
of a recent overt act represents different interpretations of the rights
of the mentally ill. The Lessard-Lynch doctrine requires that com-
mitment be based on a material demonstration of dangerousness or
inability to care for oneself. This reasoning was rejected in Mathew,
which held that the reliance upon the diagnosis of a psychiatrist was
sufficient to satisfy due process.
The Balancing Requirement
In commitment proceedings, the courts have applied a balancing
test to determine whether commitment is justified. An individual's
interest in his freedom is balanced against society's interest in pro-
tecting the individual and others from harm.43 The interests of an
individual are retaining his liberty and avoiding unwarranted civil
commitment. Prevention of the mentally ill from harming them-
selves or others, concern with antisocial conduct, caring for the men-
tally ill, and its role as parens patriae are the primary state inter-
ests.44 In People v. Sansone,45 the court determined that "the para-
mount factor is the interest of society which naturally includes the
interest of the patient in not being subjected to unjustified confine-
ment." 6
Although the courts agree on the interests to be evaluated, they
disagree on the relative weight to be attributed to each. Both Lynch
and Lessard held that the state must demonstrate that commitment
is necessary because the individual poses a threat of serious danger
of substantial harm to himself or society.47 Further, the court in In
[Ilts approval of a requirement that the potential for doing harm be "great enough
to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty" implies a balancing test in which
the state must bear the burden of proving that there is an extreme likelihood that
if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or others. Id.
42. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
43. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 323, 309 N.E.2d
733, 739 (1974); Shlensky, Constitutional Problems with Mental Commitment in Illinois, 62
ILL. B.J. 552 (1974); Friedman and Daly, Civil Commitment and the Doctrine of Balance: A
Critical Analysis, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 503 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Friedman and Daly].
44. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, (1975), United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson,
No. 72 C 2104 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 18,1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
45. 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E. 2d 733 (1974).
46. 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 323, 309 N.E.2d 733, 739 (1974).
47. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1093-95 (E.D. Wis. 1972). The Lynch court analogized to the interests of persons
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re Ballay" stated that an individual who had never been convicted
of a crime did not present a substantial threat of harm. Therefore,
the state's interest in confinement of such an individual is not over-
whelming.49 In contrast, Sansone and Mathew applied a rational
basis test.50 These courts considered the legislative judgment that
dangerousness need not be predicated on evidence of a prior overt
act, threat or omission, to be a determination which was properly
within the state's power. Neither court, in applying the balancing
test, imposed a heavy burden on the state to justify the individual's
loss of liberty.
A major inadequacy of the balancing doctrine is the assumption
that an individual's liberty and his personal welfare are severable
and antagonistic. 5 The state's interest under its parens patriae role
sanctions certain commitments as beneficial to the person. How-
ever, that asserted interest ignores the problem caused by commit-
ment: whether the state's paternalism justifies the accompanying
loss of liberty. Whenever a balance is struck between liberty and
personal welfare, a presumption has been made that the state is
better equipped than the individual to decide what constitutes that
person's well-being. It has been suggested that, "If a balance is to
be struck at all, then it is a balance between coercion and liberty. 52
Standards of Due Process in Civil Commitment Proceedings
Traditionally, individuals subject to the civil commitment pro-
cess have not been afforded the stringent safeguards required in
criminal proceedings. 3 The imposition of a less demanding
accused of criminal offenses in retaining their liberty. 386 F. Supp. at 387. The Lessard court
translated the requirement of dangerousness into a tripartite burden of proof imposed on the
state: 1) the individual must be shown to be suffering in fact from some mental illness at the
time of the full hearing on the necessity for confinement, 2) the individual is in immediate
danger of inflicting injury upon himself or upon others at the time of the hearing, and 3) the
individual's dangerousness must be demonstrated by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to
do substantial harm to oneself or another. Id. at 1093-95. See Note, Lessard v. Schmidt: Due
Process and Involuntary Commitment, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 585, 627 (1973).
48. 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
49. Id. at 656.
50. U.S. ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, No. 72 C 2104 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 18, 1975); People v.
Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 323, 309 N.E.2d 733, 739 (1974).
51. Friedman and Daly, supra note 43, at 515.
52. Id. at 516. The mentally ill have been regarded as an exception to the compelling
justification test imposed on a state whenever it attempts to interfere with certain civil
liberties. In other contexts, such as the freedom of association, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960), or freedom of travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court has
provided strict safeguards for fundamental rights.
53. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). The court in Mathew was
not confronted with certain issues addressed by the court in Lessard, such as notice and
opportunity to be heard, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and hearsay
evidence.
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standard has been primarily justified on two grounds: the proceed-
ings are civil and not criminal; and the parens patriae rationale that
the commitment actually benefits the individual. 4 However, the
validity of these arguments is eroding because of society's changing
attitude toward the mentally disturbed.
Irrespective of the designation given a commitment proceeding,
the consequence for the person affected is involuntary confine-
ment.5" The Lessard court opined that the argument for the imposi-
tion of different due process safeguards in civil and criminal pro-
ceedings, had been laid to rest by the Supreme Court. The Court
in In re Gault56 and In re Winship, 7 rejected different standards of
due process for juveniles in delinquency proceedings. The Winship
Court, in discussing the argument for different standards, held that
"[c]ivil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate" the
need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile proceedings
which could result in the loss of liberty. 8 Gault-Winship reasoning
has been applied to civil commitment of the mentally ill." The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Ballay, in comparing the
implications of civil commitment and juvenile proceedings, con-
cluded that "the loss of liberty-the interest of 'transcending
value'-is obviously as great for those civilly committed as for the
criminal or juvenile delinquent."" °
The Appellate Court of Illinois, in People v. Sansone,"' inter-
preted the Illinois Mental Health Code as affording an individual a
54. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1086-88 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
55. Frankel, Preventive Restraints and Just Compensation: Toward a Sanction Law of the
Future, 78 YALE L.J. 229, 234 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Frankel]. The author criticizes the
designation of commitment proceedings of deviant individuals as either criminal or civil for
being "conclusionary rather than analytical and cannot meaningfully be used to justify differ-
ences in the constitutional standards applied." Id. at 235-36. See Note, Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill: Due Process and Equal Protection, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 187, 202-03 (1969). The
article concluded:
It is apparent that as long as the courts engage in legal semantics, and fail to
consider the true nature of the admission proceeding, protection of the patient's
legal rights will be hampered.
Id.
56. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
57. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
58. Id. at 365-66 (1970). The Court restated the Gault logic that loss of liberty in a juvenile
proceeding is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.
59. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972); People v. Sansone, 18 111. App. 3d 315, 325, 309 N.E.2d 733, 740
(1974).
60. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
61. 18 111. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974). See Beis, Civil Commitment: Rights of the
Mentally Disabled, Recent Developments and Trends, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 42 (1973), for an
analysis of procedural due process protections provided by the Illinois Mental Health Code.
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full panoply of due process protections, even though civil labels were
utilized. Sansone stated that the Code satisfied the reasoning of
Winship and Gault because it recognized the need for due process
safeguards regardless of the language used to describe the process.
The court held that the protection provided by the Illinois Code
reflected a rational balance between the interests of the individual
and society in the administration, treatment, and hospitalization of
the mentally ill. 2
Although the issue of procedural due process was not raised, the
Mathew court summarized certain statutory provisions relating to
due process protection.13 The court's discussion indicates its accept-
ance of the due process notions implemented in the Mental Health
Code 4.6 The Mathew court recognized that involuntary commitment
of the mentally ill imposes such a substantial infringement of basic
liberties that it requires a full range of constitutional protections. 5
The parens patriae justification for relaxing due process require-
ments in the procedure is premised on the presumption that an
individual derives benefit from civil commitment. However, this
reasoning has been questioned in recent cases in the mental health
area. The Lessard court considered the argument that the parens
patriae role permits the lifting of procedural safeguards. The court
observed that the validity of the argument "appears to rest in part
on the realities of better treatment for the person subjected to incar-
ceration in a civil proceeding." 7 Recognizing the uncertainty of the
effectiveness of the treatment for mental disturbance, the Lessard
court found the parens patriae argument unconvincing. 8 The effec-
tiveness of the treatment and the institutional conditions raise seri-
ous doubts about the benefit being provided to the confined individ-
ual. Commitment premised on the benefit derived therefrom by the
individual is hardly justified if the means undertaken to secure that
benefit are inadequate."
62. 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 325, 309 N.E.2d 733, 740 (1974).
63. No. 72 C 2104, slip opinion, at 3.
64. The Illinois Mental Health Code provides for initial commitment on the certificate of
a physician and, under emergency conditions, without such a certificate, but requires that
in either case a qualified psychiatrist must examine the patient within 24 hours. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 911/2, §§ 6-1, 7-1 et seq. (1973). The statute.also provides for the right to a prompt
judicial hearing on the issue of whether the person is subject to commitment. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 911/2, §§ 6-4, 8-1 et seq., 9-1 et seq., 10-1 et seq. (1973).
65. The court refused to require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
person is in need of treatment. See text accompanying notes 70 through 86, infra.
66. Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413, 417 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1087 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966, 972 (M.D.
Pa. 1971).
67. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
68. Id.
69. See ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMM'N, PATIENT DEATHS AT ELGIN STATE
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Burden of Proof
While due process safeguards have been greatly extended in civil
commitment proceedings, the courts have not imposed a uniform
burden of proof requirement. Four standards of proof have been
applied to commitment proceedings: (1) beyond a reasonable
doubt;7" (2) clear, unequivocal and convincing;7 (3) clear and con-
vincing;72 and (4) preponderance of the evidence. In determining
the appropriate standard of proof the courts have looked to stan-
dards applied in deportation and juvenile proceedings.
The Supreme Court held in a leading deportation case that the
government must establish the facts supporting deportation by
clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.7" By contrast, in juve-
nile proceedings the Court has required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.7" The stringency of the standard of proof reflects the value
society places on a particular individual's liberty."
The Lessard court held that the state must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt all facts necessary to show that an individual is men-
tally ill and dangerous. The court determined that a civil commit-
ment occasioned an even greater deprivation of liberty than either
a deportation or juvenile hearing." The heavy burden on the state
was justified because to do otherwise would deprive individuals of
basic civil rights and would impose a stigma resulting from the lack
HOSPITAL (1974) for a thorough report on the inadequate facilities and organization of a state
institution.
70. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 365 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
71. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 393 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Dixon v. Attorney General,
325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
72. Tippet v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, sub nor. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court,
407 U.S. 355 (1972); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 326, 309 N.E.2d 733, 740 (1974).
73. Tippet v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1159 (4th Cir. 1971).
74. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966). The Court
stated:
To be sure, a deportation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution. But it does not
syllogistically follow that a person may be banished from this country upon no
higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence case.
Id.
75. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970). The court emphasized the necessity for
caution because of the possibility of the individual losing his freedom, and the certainty of
stigmatization by the conviction. Id.
76. Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan defined a standard of proof as "an
attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication."
Id.
77. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1094-95 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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of confidentiality of the adjudication."
The Lynch court rejected the reasonable doubt standard an-
nounced in Lessard, in favor of a clear, unequivocal and convincing
standard of proof." The court expressed reasoning similar to that
pronounced by the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Sansone.0
The Sansone court applied the nearly identical clear and convincing
standard.8 Both courts refused to require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt primarily because of the difficulties in proving a subjective
state of mind.12 In addition, the Sansone court rejected the reasona-
ble doubt standard because that requirement would impede access
to care and treatment. The court reasoned that under this stringent
standard fewer individuals would be committed, thereby depriving
them of care and treatment. The issue of the proper standard of
proof was not before the court in Mathew.13 Nevertheless, the court
addressed this issue, and adopted the Sansone standard of clear and
convincing.84
Although Illinois has recognized a right to treatment, 5 the United
States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutional basis of
such a right. It is therefore questionable whether the presumed
benefits of commitment support the imposition of a standard of
proof less strict than the reasonable doubt test.
Two interests must be considered and weighed in determining the
state's burden of proof: the individual's interest in his basic free-
doms, and the state's interest in protecting the individual and oth-
ers from dangerous conduct. The determination is complicated by
the difficulties encountered in the evaluation of an individual's
subjective mental processes, and by the nebulous concept of a right
78. Id.
79. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 393 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
80. 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974).
81. Id. at 325-26, 309 N.E.2d at 740-41.
82. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp 378, 393 (M.D. Ala. 1974). The court stated that
subjective questions of the subject's mental condition and the likelihood that he will be
dangerous in the future cannot ordinarily be made with the same degree of certainty that
might be achieved where purely objective facts and occurrences are at issue. In People v.
Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 326, 309 N.E.2d at 741, the court stated:
[Tihe difficulty in proving an individual's state of mind, combined with a strin-
gent reasonable-doubt standard, may work a hardship on the individual who has a
right to treatment and society which has a right to protection.
83. No. 72 C 2104, slip opinion, at 14. Plaintiffs were tried by a judge, and there is no
indication in the record of the standard of proof used in their commitments. The issue would
be clear in a jury trial where instructions were given or in a bench trial where the court
indicates the standard used. Motion to Amend Stipulation as to Issue and to Dismiss One of
the Actions, at 2.
84. No. 72 C 2104, slip opinion, at 14.
85. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, §§ 1-9 and 12-1 (1973).
86. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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to treatment. Since the result of involuntary commitment is the loss
of freedom, the state must be required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the facts necessary to support commitment. The criminal
standard of proof is appropriate for a civil proceeding where the
individual's freedom is at issue.
Least Restrictive Alternatives
Courts have applied the principle of the least restrictive alterna-
tive to the civil commitment area. 7 In accordance with this doc-
trine, a state is limited in the means by which it pursues a govern-
mental purpose. Even though it is exercising a legitimate and sub-
stantial function, a state must seek means by which the end can be
more narrowly achieved without stifling fundamental personal lib-
erties.8 The doctrine was not discussed in Mathew. However, its use
by other courts indicates its importance in the determination of
whether viable alternatives to institutional confinement are feasi-
ble.
The Lessard court held that the party recommending full-time
involuntary hospitalization must bear the burden of proving: (1)
what alternatives are available; (2) what alternatives were investi-
gated; and (3) why the investigated alternatives were not deemed
suitable.89 Examples of alternatives to confinement include: out-
patient treatment, day or night treatment in hospitals, placement
in the custody of a willing and able friend, placement in a nursing
home and referral to a community health clinic. ° The Lessard court
found the concept especially attractive in situations where a men-
tally disturbed individual has not committed any crime. An individ-
ual who has not displayed his dangerousness or inability to care for
himself by an overt act such as a criminal offense, should not suffer
a serious infringement of his personal liberties merely on the subjec-
tive analysis of a psychiatrist.
COMMITMENT AND PSYCHIATRY
The consequence of not requiring evidence of a recent overt act,
threat or omission is to place nearly total reliance on the opinion of
87. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d
657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 393 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F.
Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971). See Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1108, 1151
(1972).
88. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
89. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
90. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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the testifying physician in the commitment proceeding. Mathew
upheld this procedure as a rational exercise of a state's power. How-
ever, in respect to the present state of the psychiatric art, it is
questionable whether psychiatrists and physicians are capable of
accurately predicting dangerousness. Thus, an individual whose
commitment is not predicated on evidence of dangerousness in-
ferred from an overt act is vulnerable to the predilections of the
testifying physician."
The Mathew court recognized that the medical profession is in
agreement on the difficulty of accurately predicting dangerousness
or inability to care for oneself. However, the court conceded that the
profession is in disagreement on its ability to satisfy the commit-
ment criteria in the absence of an overt act.2 Nevertheless, the court
sustained conimitments based on a psychiatric prediction that did
not rely on a prior overt act to infer dangerousness. It reasoned that
the commitment procedure reflected a rational appraisal of the sci-
entific knowledge then available. In light of the conflicting evidence
submitted by the parties, the court's reasoning is suspect.93 The
Mathew court upheld a procedure which is highly speculative, and
which does not provide constitutional safeguards commensurate
with those in criminal cases, where the deprivation of liberty is
identical."
Commitment-Medical v. Legal Viewpoints
The Mathew court, in rejecting the argument that doctors become
triers of fact, maintained that persons are not committed solely on
the basis of the doctor's prediction." The respective roles of the legal
and medical professions in the commitment procedure has been the
91. Livermore, Malmquist, and Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117
U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Livermore]. The authors, in examining the
American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic manual, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, observed that the definition of mental illness is left largely to the user and
is dependent upon the norms of adjustment he employs. Id. at 80.
92. No. 72 C 2104, slip opinion, at 16. The court summarized the evidence as indicating
that it is extremely difficult to predict future behavior and that there is considerable disagree-
ment among the experts whether dangerousness or inability to care for oneself can be pre-
dicted absent an overt act, omission or threat. Id.
93. Dr. Argudin, a state employee called by the plaintiff, believed that in certain instan-
ces she could determine that a person who had not committed a prior overt act was dangerous,
with about 50 percent accuracy. Dr. Escalona, a state employee, testified that a prediction
of dangerousness, in the absence of an overt act, would not be accurate because there would
be no basis for such a prediction.
94. Frankel, supra note 55, at 234.
95. No. 72 C 2104, slip opinion, at 22. The court cited two cases reversing commitments
because the evidence had not supported the psychiatrist's opinion. People v. Bradley, 22 Ill.
App. 3d 1076, 318 N.E.2d 267 (1974); In re Sciara, 21 Ill. App. 3d 889, 316 N.E.2d 153 (1974).
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focal point of vehement disagreement between and within those
professions." This conflict centers on the language to be employed,
the legal safeguards to be afforded the individual, and the proper
party to make the commitment decision.97
According to a certain segment of the medical profession, the legal
procedures governing commitment hinder treatment of the patient.
Moreover, the medical profession argues that the similarity of the
proceedings to criminal trials perpetuates the stigma attached to
the mentally ill. 8 The use of a jury trial in commitment proceedings
is abhored by certain physicians and psychiatrists.9 Essentially, the
argument maintains that the open airing of a patient's mental con-
dition will do positive harm to the individual.
In certain instances these medical criticisms of the legal position
reflect a misinterpretation of the underlying intent of the commit-
ment procedure.'"" It is fundamental that procedural due process
96. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (S. Brakel
& R. Rock ed. 1971).
97. Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Excerpt from testimony presented on behalf of the American
Psychiatric Association, at 81; Excerpt from testimony presented by Francis J. Braceland,
M.D., Psychiatrist in Chief, the Institute of Living, Hartford, Conn., and Jack R. Ewalt,
M.D., Head of Dept. of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Mass.
From a medical point of view, the worst features of the commitment laws of the
past (and some of these features are still with us in some states) are such require-
ments as these: That the patient must be given "notice" that he is to be committed;
insistence that the patient appear personally in court with consequent exposure of
his problems to the public; the frequent identification of mental illness with crimi-
nality as a result of court procedures; the acceptance of a lay judgment as to the
degree of illness as occurs, for example, in a jury trial; frequent acceptance of
commitment as tantamount to legal incompetence, thus depriving a mental patient
of his civil rights; the use of archaic legal terminology such as "insane," "of unsound
mind," "idiot," "feebleminded," etc-all of them conveying a legal, rather than a
medical, meaning; and embarrassing inquiries into the patient's financial status at
the time of his commitment . . . . In general, psychiatrists favor a simple commit-
ment procedure entailing an application to the hospital by a close relative or
friend, and a certification by two qualified physicians that they have examined the
subject and found him to be mentally ill.
98. Hearings, supra note 97, at 80, 81.
99. Id. at 65, Statement of F. Braceland:
While I realize that jury trial and the right to it is fundamental for every citizen if
he requests it, it does seem a shame to have a man who is sick and delusional and
with no insight held up in open court and all of his delusional ideas exposed in open
court.
See also G. HAUGEN, THE PSYCHIATRIST AS A WITNESS 50-51 (1966). The author argues:
The most absurd suggestion regarding commitment, which is still possible in some
states, is to call a jury trial. To expect a group of laymen to make a medical
diagnosis in a field in which not even all physicians are competent stretches one's
credulity.
100. See MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 666 (A. Noyes & L. Kols ed. 1958). The authors
offered the opinion:
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safeguards are employed whenever an individual is threatened with
an involuntary loss of freedom. 0'
The great fear of the legal profession, of course, is that without
adequate procedural safeguards perfectly sane members of society
may be "railroaded" into mental institutions by unscrupulous re-
latives or business associates.' 2
The hesitancy of the law to consider only the medical ramifications
of commitments is influenced by other important effects on the
committed individual, e.g., degree of confinement, loss of civil
rights, limitation of communications and social ostracism.'0 Mem-
bers of the legal profession have concluded:
Despite the impatience of medical men and others with legal prac-
tices, it is nevertheless true that legal "technicalities" represent
the lawmakers' effort to apply principles of fairness and justice in
dealing with human rights which have been established only by the
blood and sweat of bygone generations who saw and suffered the
effects of more summary methods.' 4
The difficulty in reconciling the legal and medical positions cen-
ters on misinterpretation by each profession of the other's inten-
tions. The commitment procedure should not be constructed by the
legal sector in a medically unreasonable manner; conversely, a rea-
sonably determined legal procedure must be fully observed by the
medical profession. 05 The commitment process will be acceptable
to medical opinion when the criminal aspects of the procedure are
eliminated. This goal can be achieved by discontinuing the use of
criminal terminology, removing the police from the commitment
process and implementing informal hearings. 06 Nevertheless, de-
[O]ne of the important differences between the psychiatrist and the lawyer is in
their respective attitudes toward the admission of the mentally ill person to a
hospital. The psychiatrist urges that the dignity of the patient be respected and
that the obstacles to his admission be no greater than those experienced by the
physically sick person.
This statement was criticized by Dr. Thomas Szasz, a physician, in T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY,
AND PsYCHIcTy 42 (1963):
This view, though often held by psychiatrists, is not only propagandistic and self-
congratulatory but also false .... The history of Anglo-American law is one of
unremitting striving for liberty and dignity in human affairs.
101. Thomas, Procedures for Involuntary Commitment on the Basis of Alleged Mental
Illness, 42 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 231, 249 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Thomas].
102. Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REV.
383, 387 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Kutner].
103. Id. at 386.
104. Weihofen and Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally III, 24 TEX. L. REv. 307,336-
37 (1946).
105. Kutner, supra note 102, at 388.
106. Id. at 393.
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spite the removal of the criminal trappings, the substantive rights
of the mentally disturbed cannot be subordinated to matters of
formality.
The medical profession has objected to the legal system's interfer-
ence with the doctor-patient relationship. This objection has been
criticized by Dr. Thomas Szasz for ignoring the conflicting roles
played by the psychiatrist in the proceedings.'"7 He maintains that
the psychiatrist, by testifying in the proceedings, fulfills a special
social role of enforcing compliance with certain social rules. Szasz
acknowledges that this role may be "legitimate and morally defensi-
ble," but contends it is a social role similar to that performed by
policemen and judges, and is quite dissimilar from the therapeutic
role.' 0s Therefore, the social role performed by the psychiatrist is
unrelated to his technical knowledge.
Mental Illness
The courts' complete reliance on medical judgments in commit-
ment proceedings is misguided. ' It has been suggested "that men-
tal illness is not a fact in the same sense that a broken leg is, it is a
theory used to explain deviant behavior.""' Further, the contention
that the psychiatrist is the most qualified person to decide commit-
ment"' has been disputed.
A major criticism of the courts' abdication of their function as the
ultimate decision-maker in commitment proceedings is centered on
the inability of the psychiatric discipline to reach a consensus on a
definition of mental illness.' 2 The numerous definitions in the diag-
nostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association"3 reveal the
107. Szasz, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Treatment or Social Restraint?, 125 J.
NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 293, 296 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Szasz]. Dr. Szasz is a
Professor of Psychiatry at the State University of New York Upstate Medical Center in
Syracuse, N.Y. See Thomas, supra note 101, at 248; Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV. 945 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Ross].
108. Szasz, supra note 107.
109. Ross, supra note 107, at 961. He argues that
exclusive reliance upon the psychiatrist or physician arises in part from the assump-
tion that the diagnostic aspect of psychiatry is a branch of medicine. Psychiatry is
primarily an art rather than a science.
See T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL (1966), for a discussion of legal and psychiatric screening
of incoming patients. The study found a pre-existing policy of summary action, minimal
investigation and avoidance of responsibility.
110. Ross, supra note 110.
111. Id. at 961. Ross views commitment as depending on social value judgments. "[Any
decision will draw a line between the conflicting policies of individual liberty and state
sanctions against self-destruction. Clearly this is not a medical or even a psychiatric judg-
ment."
112. Thomas, supra note 101, at 249.
113. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
19761
Loyola University Law journal [Vol. 7
elusiveness of the concept of mental illness." 4 The definitional im-
precision has created a situation where
the diagnostician has the ability to shoehorn into the medically
diseased class almost any person he wishes, for whatever reason,
to put there."'
The notion that the mentally disturbed are afflicted with a dis-
ease is not universally accepted by the medical profession. It has
been suggested that the concept of mental illness is a myth."' 6
Critics of the disease model recognize that personal unhappiness
and socially deviant behavior do exist. However, it is proposed "that
we categorize them as diseases at our own peril.""' Those commen-
tators who distinguish between physical and mental "diseases"
emphasize that in the former something happens to us, whereas in
the latter it is something we do."'
Critics of the mental illness concept assert that the failure to
address deviancy in terms of public and social policy has resulted
in commitment of individuals because they are different, not be-
cause they are ill. This result is not considered a coincidence:
In view of the role played by subjective factors and vagueness of
psychiatric labels, it is not surprising that diagnoses of mental
illness may often focus on various subgroups and minority groups
which are under-represented in the psychiatric profession."'
One solution is to pose the commitment inquiry in terms of "who
annoys or disturbs whom.' 20 The response to this question, it is
suggested, will reveal that commitment is a social procedure, which
DiSOaERS (2d ed. 1968).
114. Livermore, supra note 91, at 80. The definitions of the concept range from
[Tihe massive functional inhibition characteristic of one form of catatonic schizo-
phrenia to those seemingly slight aberrancies associated with an emotionally unsta-
ble personality, but which are so close to conduct in which we all engage as to define
the entire continuum involved.
115. Livermore, supra note 91, at 80. See Roth, Dayleh, and Lerner, Into the Abyss:
Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 400, 411
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Roth]. The authors argued:
. . . errors of conceptualization and method have resulted in diagnostic terms of
sufficient generality and abstraction that virtually anyone can manifest symptoms
or fit some category of mental illness.
116. T. SzAsz, LAW, LBERTY, AND PSYCIATRY 11-17 (1963).
117. Id. at 17; Szasz considers the concept of illness, whether mental or physical, as a
deviation from a norm. In respect to "mental illness" the norm is a psychosocial and ethical
one. However, Szasz argues, medical answers are sought as a remedy. Id. at 14.
118. Id. at 17. See J. BaOWN, FREUD AND THE POST-FREUDIANS 81 (1961). The author
expresses the view that "neurosis is not a disease in the medically accepted sense ... it is
not something a person has but rather something that he is."
119. Roth, supra note 115, at 407.
120. Szasz, supra note 107, at 299.
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is dependent on a social hierarchy organized in terms of power.",
Although the psychiatric profession has recognized the serious
defects in earlier treatment methods, it is confident that psychiatry
has advanced to a socially acceptable stage. 2 ' Therefore, it is con-
tended, psychiatry believes it necessary "to modify legal procedures
which will facilitiate and not hinder prompt access to treatment by
all citizens.' '1 3 This analysis of psychiatric progress has not received
universal acceptance.'24 One review of systematic studies of the pub-
lic's attitude toward mental health observed:
The evidence of the failure to convince the public to adopt the
mental illness myth together with the logical and humanistic argu-
ments against the myth, demand a reevaluation of the whole enter-
prise concerned with informing the public on the issue of inappro-
priate and improper behavior.' 5
The study concluded that "the moral enterprise embodied in the
well-intentioned work of mental health professionals has failed."'26
The conflict within the psychiatric profession on the concept of
mental illness, i.e., whether it is a disease, how should it be defined
and even whether it exists at all, creates serious problems in com-
mitment proceedings.' Before the questions of dangerousness or
inability to care for self can be addressed, the initial question of
whether the individual is mentally ill must be resolved. As presently
defined, the concept of mental illness is flexible and tends to vary
with the individual diagnostician. Consequently, the individual is
subjected to the varying attitudes of particular psychiatrists. Since
the medical profession is currently unable to resolve the mental
illness question, the judicial system must protect the individual in
the second inquiry, i.e., whether the individual is dangerous or un-
121. Id. See Shah, Dangerousness and Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Some Public
Policy Considerations, 132 AM. J. PsYcH. 501, 504 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Shah].
122. Hearings, supra note 97, at 80, Excerpt from Testimony Presented on Behalf of the
A.P.A. The psychiatric profession believes "that the public has become more sympathetic
with the view that accepts mental illness as an illness which is correctible and modifiable if
treated by modem therapies."
123. Id.
124. Sarbin and Mancuso, Failure of Moral Enterprise: Attitudes of the Public Toward
Mental Illness, J. CONSULT. & CLINICAL PSYCH. 159 (1970). The authors' intention was to
illuminate some of the consequences of continuing to persuade the public to employ the
illness metaphor to describe improprieties in social and personal behavior.
125. Id. at 161. The study concluded that the public is not sympathetic toward persons
who are labelled mentally ill and the public does not share the professional's propensity for
labelling deviant behavior as mental illness. Id. at 168.
126. Id. at 172.
127. Id. The article suggests that "... we are left with a far-reaching problem in juris-
prudence, law enforcement, education, social engineering, and morality." Id. at 163.
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able to care for himself. Otherwise, the individual may be commit-
ted on the basis of two inquiries, neither of which has been clearly
resolved by the medical profession.
Predictions of Dangerousness
Section 1-11, as interpreted in Sansone and Mathew, places the
major responsibility of determining dangerousness or inability to
care for oneself on the examining physician. An accurate prediction
is more difficult to obtain without a requirement of a recent overt
act, threat or omission." 8 If the prediction is not certain, the individ-
ual is committed on a psychiatric speculation.
The ability to assess and predict dangerous behavior is dependent
upon the behavior being understood in reference to its social, situa-
tional, and environmental context.'29 Before an individual is com-
mitted as dangerous it should be demonstrated that the probabili-
ties are very high that a dangerous act will be committed.'30 In
Millard v. Harris,'3' the court delineated the factors to be evaluated
in predicting dangerousness:
Predictions of dangerousness, whether under the Sexual Psycho-
path Act or in some other context, require determinations of sev-
eral sorts; the type of conduct in which the individual may engage:
the likelihood or probability that he will in fact indulge in that
conduct; and the effect such conduct if engaged in will have on
others. '32
A major criticism of predictions of deviant conduct is the tend-
ency to overpredict.'1 "Operation Baxstrom" is a prime example of
overprediction. In 1966, the Supreme Court's decision in Baxstrorn
v. Herold'34 resulted in the New York State Department of Correc-
tion transferring over 900 patients committed to the state's hospital
for the criminally insane to New York's civil mental hospitals. A
128. Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARCH. OF GEN.
PSYCH. 397, 400 (1972). The author suggests "the difficulty in the prediction of dangerousness
is immeasurably increased when the subject has never actually performed an assaultive act."
Id.
129. Shah, supra note 121, at 502.
130. Livermore, supra note 91, at 89. The author suggests that the magnitude of the
probability of danger will depend on two factors: the seriousness of the probable dangerous
act, and the likelihood that the mental condition can be changed by treatment. See Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 23, at 1238 for a discussion of the probability of
harm and the calculations involved in determining the magnitude of harm.
131. 406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
132. Id. at 973.
133. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment: A Knife that Cuts Both
Ways, 2 PSYCH. TODAY 32, 33 (1969).
134. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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follow-up study revealed the inaccuracy of labelling these individu-
als too dangerous to be placed in hospitals for the civilly commit-
ted. '3 The incidence of overprediction indicates that testimony of
an expert must be thoroughly examined "so that the people and not
the pundits may decide how much deprivation of individual liberty
should be permitted to a tolerable level of safety."' 36
Studies of the potential dangerousness of the mentally ill indicate
they deviate slightly from the general population.' 37 Those studies
which found the mentally ill slightly more dangerous than the norm
did not discover any substantial incidence of a higher crime rate in
the sample group.' 3 Therefore, no prediction of dangerousness
based upon the presumption that the mentally ill are more danger-
ous than the general population is supported by the evidence.
135. Hunt and Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One Year, 124 AM. J. PSYCH. 974, 977
(1968). The authors conclude:
Most of them had been examined by experienced psychiatrists from the Depart-
ment of Mental Health and had been denied transfer (to a civil commitment hospi-
tal) on the grounds that they were too disturbed or potentially dangerous (before
the Court's decision). Yet over 99% of them did well in civil hospitals when the
Court's decision compelled the move. Id.
136. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions about Predictions, 23 J. OF
LEGAL ED. 24 (1970).
137. See Giovannoni and Gurel, Socially Disruptive Behavior of Ex-Mental Patients, 17
ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 146 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Giovannoni]; Rappeport & Lassen,
Dangerousness-Arrest Rate Comparisons of Discharged Patients and the General
Population, 121 AM. J. PSYCH. 776 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Rappeport] (slightly more
dangerous); Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the
Baxstrom Patients: 1966.1970, 129 AM. J. PSYCH. 304 (1972), (slightly less dangerous).
138. Giovannoni, supra note 137, at 146-52. The article reports on the examination of the
incidence of socially disruptive acts committed by patients in the Veterans Administration's
Psychiatric Evaluation Project. The patients surveyed were under 60 years of age. The study
revealed a higher patient rate than the general population for certain crimes against persons:
homicide, aggravated assault, and robbery. Conversely, the general population rate exceeds
that for patients in crimes against property: larceny, burglary, and auto theft. The report
concluded that the data did not substantiate the view of the ". . . average mental patient
as an unusually and predominantly dangerous person." Id. at 152. See also Rappeport, supra
note 137, at 776-79, the subjects of this study were all male patients over 16 years of age,
discharged during fiscal 1947 and fiscal 1957 from all Maryland psychiatric hospitals. The
crime rate for the whole state was used for the comparison because the limited size of the
sample group was not conducive to categorizing the hospital population into urban and rural,
and negro and white as is done in the Uniform Crime Reports. The report found a significantly
higher arrest rate for both hospital groups for the offense of robbery. However, the authors
were equivocal about the other offenses. The findings did not support the contention "(Ihat
the hospital experience had a definite effect on reducing the total arrest rate..." Id. at 779.
The limitations of these studies are apparent. The subject group is not categorized by its
socio-economic background. A comparison to the general population is not an accurate mea-
sure of deviance by the mental hospital group. The exclusion of women from the study is
another factor which disputes the accuracy.
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CONCLUSION
A disagreement exists between the federal district courts on
whether a civil commitment process, which does not require danger-
ousness or inability to care for oneself to be inferred from a recent
overt act, threat or omission, comports with due process. Those
courts which require overt acts emphasize the need for objective
manifestations of dangerousness, rather than the subjective opin-
ions of psychiatrists, to justify commitment. The total reliance on
psychiatry in the commitment process is misplaced because of the
confusion within that discipline on the ability to predict dangerous-
ness and even on the definition of mental illness. Therefore, civil
commitment of the mentally disturbed should be based on objective
criteria because of the nature of the individual's interest in his free-
dom and the difficulty in accurately making this determination.
MICHAEL J. HOLLAHAN
Author's Note: United States ex rel Mathew v. Nelson, No. 75-1995, was argued February
23, 1976 in the Seventh Circuit before Judges Swygert, Bauer and Perry.
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